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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ABOUT PENALTIES
-Michael

Furmston*

Abstract-This article explores the changes in the law of penalties, which was until recently considered to be settled post
the decision in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage
and Motor Co. Ltd. However, the decisions in Andrews v.
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, and in Cavendish
Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi, in Australia and the
United Kingdom respectively, have created new ripples in this
otherwise consistent position of law. In this context, the article
explores some basic principles of penalties, discusses the viability and application of the Penalty Doctrine and the manner in
which this tangibly affects the drafting of contracts. Further, the
common law relief of the Penalty Doctrine is discussed along
with the equitable remedy of Relief against Forfeiture, and the
manner in which what constitutes 'relevant factors' may differ
due to the subjectivity and discretion associated with each relief.
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently the law about penalties appeared basically well settled. The
most frequently cited judgment was that of Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic
Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd,' which recently celebrated its
century. It is striking therefore to find recent decisions of the High Court of
Australia in Andrews v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.2 and the
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal
El Makdessi,3 indicating a strong desire for change though in opposite directions.

2

3

Emeritus Professor of Law, Singapore Management University, Singapore. Professor of law,
Sunway University, Malaysia.
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage and Motor Co., 1915 AC 79 (HL).
Andrews v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd., 2012 HCA 30 (High Court of
Australia). This case has been the subject of an elaborately critical attack by no fewer than 5
leading Australian contract lawyers in JW Carter, Wayne Courtney, Elisabeth Peden, Andrew
Stewart and GJ Tolhurst in 30 Journal of Contract Law 99.
Cavendish Square Holding BVv. Talal El Makdessi, 2015 UKSC 67.
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There are in fact three cases as the Supreme Court considered two quite separate cases, with very different facts. In the High Court, there is a single judgment; in the Supreme Court the seven judges gave five judgments by Lord
Neuberger,4 Lord Sumption and Lord Carnwath (paras 1-115); Lord Mance (paras
116-214); Lord Hodge (paras 215-290); Lord Clarke (para 291) and Lord Toulson
(paras 292-316). It will be seen that there are three very substantial judgments.
On the penalty questions, there was agreement in the result, though not completely in the reasoning. Lord Toulson dissented on a separate consumer protection point.
II. HISTORY
Lord Neuberger's judgment contains an outline of the historical development
of the penalty rule. 5 This goes back to the early 16 th century when a practice
developed of taking bonds (that is promises under seal) defeasible if the promisor carried out a primary obligation. The common law enforced the bond if the
primary obligation was not performed even though the bond was for much more
than the value of the primary obligation. Equity came to restrain enforcement at
common law on terms that the debtor paid damages, interests and costs. 6
The equitable rule was taken over by the common law. Lord Neuberger
referred to Brian Simpson's article in the Law Quarterly Review.' In the late
17 th century Common Law Courts began to stay proceedings on a Penal Bond
to secure a debt, unless a Plaintiff was willing to accept a tender of the money,
together with interest and costs. The statutes of 1696 and 1705 extended this process. Lord Neuberger said,
"The law relieved the contract-breaker of the consequences
not because the objective could be secured in another way but
because the objective was contrary to public policy and should
not therefore be given effect at all. The difference in approach
to penalties of the courts of equity and the common law courts
is in many ways a classic example of the contrast between the
flexible if sometimes unpredictable approach of equity and the
clear if relatively strict approach of the common law."
4

6

This was a joint judgment of Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with which Lord Carnwath
agreed. This means that if there is a question of a majority, this counts as three votes. For brevity
I will refer to this as Lord Neuberger's judgment.
Cavendish at ¶ 4-8.
See Lord Thurlow LC in Sloman v. Walter, (1783) 1 Bro CC 418 at 419 : 28 ER 1213; Lord
Macclesfield in Peachy v. Duke of Somerset, 1 Strange 447, 453, (1720); Baggallay LJ Protector
Endowment Loan and Annuity Co. v. Grice (1880) 5 QBD 592 at 595 (CA).
A.W. Brian Simpson, The Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance, 82 Law Quarterly Review
392, 418-419, (1966). (This article was published when Brian Simpson and I were colleagues and
indeed living in the same house, a large four storey Victorian North Oxford house).
Cavendish at ¶ 7
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The practical importance of this view is brought out by comparing the rules
about penalties with the rules about relief against forfeiture, which are undoubtedly equitable and where there is, therefore, an element of judicial discretion that
is the taking into account of relevant factors.9
The High Court did not have the benefit of Lord Neuberger's speech, but it is
clear that its view of the history is different; this is most clearly stated in ¶ 51
which says, 0
"There remains for consideration the further proposition in
Interstar Wholesale Finance (Pty) Ltd. v. Integral Home Loans
(Pty) Ltd." which, rather than acknowledging the concurrent
administration in New South Wales (as elsewhere) of law and
equity, appears to treat the penalty doctrine as having disappeared from equity by absorption into the common law action
of assumpsit. The proposition should be rejected."
The Court does not refer to Brian Simpson's article, though it is referred to in
the footnotes.
It is, of course, well known, particularly to readers of Meagher, Gummow, and
Lehane,'1 2 that some Australian lawyers think that English judges misapprehend
the relationship of Common Law and equity. It may be a question whether there
is misapprehension or simply disagreement. What is clear is that in the 17th 1 8 th
and 1 9 th centuries development took place wholly in England, and that from the
1800s cases on penalties seem to be litigated in Common Law Courts. It is also,
I think, the case that earlier decisions of the High Court about penalties do not
appear to differ from the English cases. 3
III. SHOULD THE PENALTY DOCTRINE BE ABOLISHED?
In all normal circumstances it would not be argued that a rule, which has been
applied in countless House of Lords cases, should be rejected by judicial action.
But this is precisely what leading counsel for Cavendish did in this case. She
argued that the rule should be regarded as "antiquated, anomalous and unnecessary."" The Supreme Court agreed that the rule would be very unlikely to be
9

1o

12

13
14

See discussion in ¶ 10 and Hoffmann LJ in Else (1982) Ltd. v. Parkland Holdings Ltd., (1994) 1
BCLC 130.
Cavendish at ¶ 51.
2008 NSWCA 310.
Roderick P. Meagher & John D. Heydon and Mark J. Leeming, MEAGHER, GuMMOW AND LEHANE'S
EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES, (4th ed., 2002). Justice Gummow was a member of the High
Court in this case. This Judgment was handed down on 6th September 2012. It must be noted that
Justice Gummow's 7 0th birthday fell on 9th October 2012.
See Amex UDC Finance v. Austin, (1980) 162 CLR 170, (High Court of Australia).

Cavendish at

¶ 36.
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developed in its present form if one was starting today, but it did not accept that
the correct course was abolition. The reasoning is instructive."
The Court was provided with a survey of the position of other common law
jurisdictions, including the United States. All of them substantially retained
the penalty doctrine. Perhaps more striking, a similar doctrine is to be found
in major civil law jurisdictions, which all have provisions (though of course,
not identical) giving courts power to control excessively high agreed damages
provisions.1 6

This is also a position taken by a number of sets of principles designed for a
wide spread international use. So the UNIDROIT principles of international commercial contracts provide in Article 7.4.13 as follows;
"(1) Where the contract provides that a party who does not perform is to pay
a specified sum to the aggrieved party for such non-performance, the
aggrieved party is entitled to that sum irrespective of its actual harm.
(2) However, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary specified sum
may be reduced to a reasonable amount where it is grossly excessive in
relation to the harm resulting from the non-performance and to other
circumstances."
It may be instructive to cite two of these illustrations:
"1. A, a former international football player from country X, is recruited for
three years to train the players of B, a football team from country Y, at a
monthly salary of AUD 10,000. Provision is made for a severance allowance of AUD 200,000 in the event of unjustified dismissal. A is dismissed
without any justification after six months. A is entitled to the agreed sum,
even though A was immediately recruited by another team at double the
salary received from B.
2. A enters into a contract with B for the purchase of machinery which provides for payment in five instalments of EUR 50,000 each. The contract
contains a clause allowing immediate termination in the event of non-payment by A of one instalment, and authorises B to keep the sums already
paid and to recover future instalments as damages. A fails to pay the third
instalment. B keeps the EUR 100,000 already paid and claims, in addition to the return of the machinery, the EUR 150,000 representing the
¶ 36-39, ¶ 162-167

15

Cavendish at

16

See Guenter H. Treitel, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, A COMPARATIVE AcCOUNT, (1988).

& ¶ 251-265.
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three outstanding instalments. The Court will reduce the amount since A's
non-performance would result in a grossly excessive benefit for B."
Both Law Commissions have considered the penalty rule, the English Law
Commission in 1975,'7 and the Scottish Law Commission in 1999.18 In both cases,
the Commissions recommended legislation that would have expanded the scope
of the rule.
It is important to note that Lord Hodge's judgment contains substantial discussion of the Scottish position, which is the same as the English position, though
Scotland has never had the formal distinction between Common Law and equity.
IV. CAN THE PENALTY RULE BE APPLIED IF
THERE IS NO BREACH OF CONTRACT?
This is the central question addressed in Andrews. It arose in the context of
bank charges for unauthorized overdrafts. This question had been discussed in
an English case, which does not appear to have been cited to the High Courts.
The general question does not arise on the facts of Cavendish but the judgment
of the High Court is the subject of extensive comment. It would be sensible to go
back to look at the development of English Law. There is a very useful historical account in the Law Commission Working Paper. 9 The Law Commission has
more space than the average textbook editor.

'

At the time of the Law Commission working paper the leading case was
Campbell Discount v. Bridge20 in which there was a hire purchase contract for a
motorcar. The contract contained a clause that provided that if the hirer failed to
make a payment, that the owner could retake possession of the car and recover
a minimum payment. Such a clause, standard at the time, was clearly capable of
being held a penalty. The contract contained another clause, permitting the hirer
to terminate the contract and return the car, but with the requirement to make the
same minimum payment. After paying the deposit and the first monthly rent Mr.
Bridge wrote a letter saying,2
"Dear Sir,
Owing to unforeseen personal circumstances I am very sorry
but I will not be able to pay any more payments on the Bedford
a

Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid, (The English Law Commission, Working Paper

no. 61, 1975). ("Law Commission Working Paper").
1

Scottish Law Commission, Report on Penalty Clauses, (Scot. Law Com. No. 171, 1999).

2

Law Commission Working Paper at ¶ 17-26.
Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co. Ltd., 1962 AC 600 : (1962) 2 WLR 439 (HL). ("Campbell").
See also Lombank Ltd. v. Kennedy and Whitelaw, 1961 NI 182.

2

Campbell at 20.
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Dormobile. Will you please let me know when and where I will
have to return the car? I am very sorry regarding this but I have
no alternative."
The finance company claimed that this letter was an exercise of the contractual right to terminate and therefore the penalty doctrine was not involved. 2 2
The Court of Appeal accepted this argument. The House of Lords allowed
the appeal. Viscount Simonds agreed with the Court of Appeal that Mr. Bridge's
letter was an exercise of his option to terminate and could not therefore be a
penalty. The remaining members of the House thought that the letter should be
treated as a breach of contract and therefore the penalty rules were applicable and
the minimum payment provision was a penalty.
The House was however fundamentally divided as to what the position would
have been if the correct construction of Mr. Bridge's letter had been an exercise
of his right to return the car. Lord Morton agreed with Viscount Simonds that in
that case it could not be a penalty. Lord Denning and Devlin disagreed but not
for the same reason. Lord Devlin thought that a provision could not be inside,
and outside at the penalty area at the same time. He said,
"My Lords, I do not see how an agreement can be genuine for
one purpose and a sham for another. If it is a sham, it means
that it was never made and does not exist; if it does not exist
it must be ignored all together: it cannot be a part of Clause 9
when that clause is applied by virtue of Clause 6 or Clause 8
and not a part of it when it is applied by virtue of Clause 7.
There is no agreement to pay a sum irrespective of depreciation,
as the price of exercising the options, and I am not prepared to
construct one."
Lord Denning took a substantially wider view,
"Let no one mistake the injustice of this. It means that equity
commits itself to this absurd paradox: It will grant relief to a
man who breaks his contract but will penalize the man who
keeps it. If this be the state of equity today, then it is in sore
need of an overhaul so as to restore its first principles. But I am
quite satisfied that such is not the state of equity today. This
case can be brought within long-established-principles without
recourse to any new equity."
It is perhaps a surprise that the High Court in Andrews did not refer to this.
22

Campbell Discount Co. Ltd. v. Bridge, (1961) 1 QB 445 : (1961) 2 WLR 596.
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The conventional view is that the matter was resolved for English Law by the
decision of the House of Lords in Export Credits Guarantee Deptt. v. Universal
Oil Products Co.23 but this is a somewhat unsatisfactory decisive case. The facts
were so complex that they are not explained in any of the judgments of the High
Court, the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords. Broadly, there were a number
of complex interlocking agreements relating to the construction of an oil refinery
in Newfoundland. There were a large number of promissory notes, which were
guaranteed by the Plaintiff and in respect of a good, many of which the guarantee was called up. The Plaintiff sued in respect of these sums but the actions
were not against those who had failed to pay. It is certainly the case that the
Defendants sought to invoke the penalty doctrine and that Lord Roskill, delivering the only speech in the House of Lords, held that it did not apply, but it is also
true that he said that the sum the Plaintiffs sought to recover was the actual loss.
There is no serious discussion of the cases.
This question was not before the Supreme Court in Cavendish, but both Lord
Neuberger 2 4 and Lord Hodge 25 affirmed the limitation to cases of breach. It is
realistic to regard this as binding in English Law at least for the lower courts. It
is perhaps not wholly inconceivable that the Supreme Court could be persuaded,
on the right facts, to a different view. The central question is whether a skilful
draftsman should be restricted in their ability to side step the rule which is after
all one of substance. The argument the other way is that once one has opened
this door it is not clear where to stop.
The position in the Court of Appeal is shown by the decision of a strong
court, including two future Law Lords 26 in Lombard North Central Plc v.
Butterworth.2 7 In this case the Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into a contract
for the lease of a computer for 5 years. There was an initial payment of 584.05
£ and a further 19 of the same amount, payable every 3 months (making a total
of 11681.00 f). Clause 2 (a) of the contract contained a provision that a punctual
payment of the instalments was of the essence to the contract. The Defendant had
a poor payment history and in due course the Plaintiff retook possession of the
computer, sold it for 172.85 £ and sued for the balance of the price, some 6869.97
E. The Court of Appeal was clear that the penalty rule did not apply to this provision and the sum could be recovered. Mustill, LJ. said, 28
"This is not a result which I view with much satisfaction partly
because the Plaintiffs have achieved by one means a result
23

24
25

26
27

2

Export Credits Guarantee Deptt. v. Universal Oil Products Co., (1983) 1 WLR 399 : (1983) 2 All
ER 205 (HL).

Cavendish at
Cavendish at

¶ 42.
¶ 241.

Lords Mustill and Nicholls.
Lombard North Central Plc v. Butterworth, 1987 QB 527 : (1987) 2 WLR 7 : (1987) 1 All ER
267. ("Lombard"). See Cf Financings Ltd. v. Baldock, (1963) 2 QB 104 : (1963) 2 WLR 359 (CA).
Lombard at ¶ 20-28.
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which the law of penalties might have prevented them from
reaching by another."
V. THE OVERDRAFT QUESTION
In Andrews, there was an action apparently by some 38,000 account holders
in the Federal Court against the Bank. There were apparently similar proceedings
against other banks. The action was started in the Victorian District Registry
of the Federal Court. Some parts of this litigation, after the decision of the trial
judge, were removed directly to the High Court rather than going to the Full
Court of the Federal Court, as would be the usual course. Only some parts of
the trial judge's findings were the subject of appeal, essentially whether the provisions for charges by the bank in relation to transactions by the customer, which
was not a breach of contract, could be characterized as penalties. The decision
of the High Court was that, in some circumstances, such charges could probably
be characterized as penalties and the case then went back to the trial judge to be
decided again in the light of this.
The question has now nearly completed a second journey through the
Australian Courts, though under another name, Paciocco v. Australian and New
Zealand Banking Group Ltd. There has been extensive discussion of the banks
terms, much of it directed at the banks charges for credit card customers who
failed to make their minimum payment on time. Gordon, J. held29 that some of
the provisions were penal. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. 30 The
High Court gave special leave to appeal and the appeal was heard on 4th and 5th
February 2016.31
The same question was litigated in England in Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey
National Plc. 32 This was a major challenge by the Office of Fair Trading to a
number of practices of banks in operating accounts. Andrew Smith, J. extensively
considered the question where the charges might be penalties at first instance,
and there was no appeal against his findings on this question.
In his very helpful judgment Andrew Smith, J. sets out the practice of English
banks in detail. The terms used by banks are not identical but they are very
similar. The normal practice of English banks in recent years has been to make
no charge for customers who maintain a credit balance. The review shows that,
29
30

31

32

Paciocco v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd., 2014 FCA 35, (High Court of
Australia).
Paciocco v. Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd., 2015 FCAFC 50, (Federal Court of
Australia).
The most important change is that the High Court of Australia delivered its judgment in the
Paccioco case on 27 July 2016. The case is reported at [2016] HCA 28.
Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc, 2008 EWHC 875 (Comm), (Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom). ("Abbey").
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perhaps, about half the customers would have an agreed overdraft and a not
insignificant proportion of those without an agreed overdraft would from time to
time overdraw. (Perhaps on average about 20%).
Andrew Smith, J. held33 that if a customer issues an instruction that would
overdraw his accounts or exceed his agreed limit he is not breaking his contract
but inviting the bank to make the payment. The bank might have conditions making it a breach but the bank conditions considered by him did not. Andrew Smith,
J. examined in detail the conditions of each of the relevant banks. 3 4 He was clear
that starting from the position that a provision could only be a penalty if it was
triggered by breach, none of the provisions were penal. He did not discuss at all
the amount of the charges.
VI. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES ABOUT PENALTIES
For most of the last 100 years, the standard authority cited for discussion of
whether a contractual provision is for a penalty has been the speech of Lord
Dunedin in Dunlop.
"1. Though the parties to a contract who use the words 'penalty' or liquidated
damages' may prima facie be supposed to mean what they say, yet the
expression used is not conclusive. The Court must find out whether the
payment stipulated is in truth a penalty or liquidated damages. This doctrine may be said to be found passim in nearly every case.
2. The essence of a penalty is a payment of money stipulated as in terrorem
of the offending party; the essence of liquidated damages is a genuine
covenanted pre-estimate of damage (Clydebank Engg. and Shipbuilding
35
Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda
).
3. The question whether a sum stipulated is penalty or liquidated damages
is a question of construction to be decided upon the terms and inherent
circumstances of each particular contract, judged of as at the time of the
making of the contract, not as at the time of the breach (Commr.of Public
Works v. Hills36 and Webster v. Bosanquet37 ).
4. To assist this task of construction various tests have been suggested,
which if applicable to the case under consideration may prove helpful, or
even conclusive. Such as:
33
34
35
36
37

Abbey at ¶ 64.
Abbey at ¶ 295-324.
1905 AC 6 (HL).
1906 AC 368.
1912 AC 394.
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(a) It will be held to be penalty if the sum stipulated for it is extravagant
and unconscionable in amount, in comparison with the greatest loss
that could conceivably be proved to have followed form the breach.
(Illustration given by Lord Halsbury in Clydebank Case38).
(b) It would be held to be a penalty if the breach consists only in not
paying a sum of money, and the sum stipulated is a sum greater than
39
the sum which ought to have been paid (Kemble v. Farren
). This,
though one of the most ancient instances, is truly a corollary to the
last test. Whether it had its historical origin in the doctrine of the
common law, that when A promised to pay B a sum of money on
a certain day and did not do so, B could only recover the sum with,
in certain cases, interest but could never recover further damages for
non-timeous payment, or whether it was a survival of the time when
equity reformed unconscionable bargains merely because they were
unconscionable - a subject which much exercised Jessel MR in Wallis
v. Smith40 - is probably more interesting than material.
(c) There is a presumption (but no more) that it is penalty when 'a single
lump sum is made payable by way of compensation, on the occurrence of one or more or all of several events, some of which may
occasion serious and others but trifling damage' (Lord Watson in
Lord Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron and Coal Co.41 ).
On the other hand:
(d) It is no obstacle to the sum stipulated, being a genuine pre-estimate
of damages, that the consequences of the breach are such as to make
precise pre-estimation almost an impossibility. On the contrary, that
is just the situation when it is probable that pre-estimated damages
were the true bargain between the parties (Clydebank Case 42 , Lord
Halsbury; Webster v. Bosanquet43, Lord Mersey)."
This was extensively discussed in Cavendish. No one suggested that the decision in the case was wrong or indeed that what Lord Dunedin said was wrong

38

39
40
41
42

43

1905 AC 6 (HL).
(1829) 6 Bing 141.
(1882) 21 Ch D 243 (CA).
(1886) 11 App Cas 332 (HL).
1905 AC 6 at p. 11 (HL).
1912 AC 394 at p. 398.
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but there was regret that it had been elevated into an ex cathedra statement. Lord
Neuberger said,4 4

"Lord Dunedin's speech in Dunlop achieved the status of a
quasi-statutory code in the subsequent case-law. Some of the
many decisions on the validity of damages clauses are little
more than a detailed exegesis or application of his four tests
with a view to discovering whether the clause in issue can be
brought within one or more of them. In our view, this is unfortunate. In the first place, Lord Dunedin proposed his four tests
not as rules but only as considerations which might prove helpful or even conclusive "if applicable to the case under consideration." He did not suggest that there were applicable to every
case in which the law of penalties was engaged. Second, as
Lord Dunedin himself acknowledged, the essential question was
whether the clause impugned was "unconscionable" or "extravagant." The four tests are a useful tool for deciding whether these
expressions can properly be applied to simple damages clauses
in standard contracts. But they are not easily applied to more
complex cases. To deal with those, it is necessary to consider
the rationale of the penalty rule at a more fundamental level.
What is it that makes a provision for the consequences of breach
"unconscionable"? And by comparison with what is a penalty
clause said to be "extravagant"? Third, none of the other three
Law Lords expressly agreed with Lord Dunedin's reasoning and
the four tests do not all feature in any of their speeches."
Lord Neuberger found the speech of Lord Atkinson particularly helpful. Lord
Mance 5 and Lord Hodge 46 also made cautionary remarks about Lord Dunedin.
The first and third of Lord Dunedin's propositions are uncontroversial. As for
the second, it has long been thought best to avoid references to terror, though the
references to extravagance and unconsionability in the Fourth Rule continue to be
used. It is not clear whether any of these somewhat emotive labels are appropriate. The central question is whether the contractual figure is a genuine pre-estimate of damage. But what does this mean? It is not the practice to lead evidence
as how the figure was arrived at. The figure is compared with the Courts' view
as to what a reasonable pre-estimate at the time of the contract would have been.
It is important to see that this can be a very difficult question.
This was the case in Dunlop itself. There was no direct financial loss to
Dunlop arising from the Defendant's decision to sell below list price. It is far
4
45
46

Cavendish at
Cavendish at
Cavendish at

¶ 22.
¶ 137.
¶ 221.
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from clear what damages Dunlop would have recovered on these facts if there
had been no agreed damages clause. This was, of course, why the clause was in
the contract.
It is a central finding in the case that Dunlop had a legitimate interest in
seeking to control how their products were marketed. (We do not think this way
today but it was a reasonable starting point in 1915.) It is not easy to think of any
way this could have effectively be done other than what was actually done. Of
course they were not really worried about a single isolated breach of the rules,
which would, in practice, be very difficult to catch. They were concerned about
a retailer, who deliberately set out to break the rules. If someone did this successfully, others would follow and the system would collapse. It was this danger
Dunlop was seeking to avert.
Essentially the House of Lords was deciding whether the figure was acceptable. 5 £ was worth a great deal more in 1915 than it is today but their Lordships
clearly thought it was not too large a figure. What we do not know is what would
have been an unacceptable figure.10 ? 50 ? 100 f?.0
Of course there are cases where the loss to the Plaintiff from the Defendant's
breach is clear. This is the case with the payment provisions in hire-purchase
contracts, which generated much litigation 50 years ago. Here the maximum loss
to the owner is clear from the moment of the contract and it is clear that this figure will reduce payment by payment. This means that contractual figures can be
identified as wrong and therefore not binding as in Lord Dunedin's 4(b).
There are important groups of cases that fall in between these extremes. An
important practical example is clauses providing for delay in construction contracts. Nearly all construction contracts contain provisions for delay in completion, typically at so much a day or week. The clauses are in printed standard
forms and the employer and the contractor agree to the figure to be put in the
relevant space on the form. Most contracts also contain provisions for extensions
of time on certain events.
Although these provisions are virtually universal and although the construction industry is addicted to disputes, arguments about the level of liquidated damages are relatively rare. This is because in most circumstances the provision has
advantages for both parties, for the contractor because it effectively limits his liability for delay and for the employer because he can often deduct the liquidated
damages from a payment and avoid the costs of a dispute.

47

Cavendish at

¶ 22-24, ¶

135-143,

¶ 219-221

and 245-248.
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An instructive case that was litigated is Alfred MvcAlpine Capital Projects Ltd.
v. Tilebox Ltd.4 8 In this case there was a building contract for the conversion of
a building into a top of the range office building. The contract provided for liquidated damages at the rate of 45,000 £ per week or part thereof. The figure was
the subject of detailed negotiations between the contractor, a large and experienced firm, and the employer. An important factor was that it had been estimated
that the rental value of the finished building would be of the order of 45,000 £
per week, though the market for renting top of the range office buildings is volatile. McAlpine sought a declaration that the agreed figure was a penalty. At the
time of the judgment the building was still incomplete, some two and a half years
after the contract completion date.
Jackson, J. said,49
"In my view, a pre-estimate of damages does not have to be right in order to
be reasonable. There must be a substantial discrepancy between the level of damages stipulated in the contract and the level of damages, which is likely to be suffered before it can be said that the agreed pre-estimate is unreasonable. Although
many authorities use or echo the phrase 'genuine pre-estimate' the test does
not turn upon the genuineness or honesty of the party or parties who made the
pre-estimate. The test is primarily an objective one, even though the court has
some regard to the thought processes of the parties at the time of contracting."
He held that the agreed damages clause was valid.
It is clear that there have been a number of changes in relatively recent times.
So although payment of money is the most common case, the penalty rule may
be applied where the consequence of the breach is a transfer of property.50 There
have been a number of cases starting with the decision of Colman J in Lordsvale
Finance Plc v. Bank of Zambia5 ' in which a provision in a syndicated loan agreement providing for payment of interest at a higher rate during any period when
the borrower was in default was held not to be penal. 52 Lord Neuberger, 5 3 Lord
Mance54 and Lord Hodge5 5 approved these decisions. Deposits, which used to be
thought of as subject to different rules, may be held to be penalties if larger than
the norm.5 6
48
49
51
51
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Alfred McAlpine Capital Projects Ltd. v. Tilebox Ltd., (2005) 104 Con LR 39, ("Alfred").
Alfred at ¶ 50.
Cavendish at ¶ 16, ¶ 157 and ¶ 226.
Lordsvale Finance Plc v. Bank of Zambia, 1996 QB 752 : (1996) 3 WLR 688.
See Cine Bas Filmcilik Ve Yapimcilik v. United International Pictures, 2004 ICLC 401 at ¶ 13.
See Murray v. Leisureplay Plc, 2005 IRLR 946 at ¶ 54.
Cavendish at ¶ 26.
See Cavendish at ¶ 140, 147, 152.
Cavendish at ¶ 222.
Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd., 1993 AC 573 : (1993) 2 WLR
702. See Cavendish at ¶ 234-238.
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VII. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PENALTY
RULE AND RELIEF AGAINST FORFEITURE
In developed English Law, the penalty rule is treated as common law whereas
relief against forfeiture continues to be equitable, so that there is a possibility of
discretionary taking account of relevant factors. There is substantial discussion of
the relationship." Some, at least, of their Lordships thought that there were cases
where consideration of both sets of rules would be appropriate.
An important and difficult case is Jobson v. Johnson." In this case two brothers, agreed to sell 62,566 shares in Southend United Football Club Ltd., which
made up 44.43914% of the share capital of the club, to the Defendant. In due

course they assigned the contract to the Plaintiff. The contract provided for a purchase price of 40,000 L. The Defendant agreed to pay in addition to the 40,000 a
further sum of 311,688 £ in six equal half yearly payments of 51,948 f, the first
payment to be made on 12 th February 1984.
There was a provision that if the Defendant failed to pay the first instalment,
he should return the shares and should be paid 15,000 f, and if he failed to pay
any of the later instalments, he should return the shares and be paid 40,000 E.
The Defendant paid the 40,000 £ but did not pay the first instalment. There
was then a variation agreement under which he was to pay 300,000 £ in instalments. He paid 100,000 £ but did not pay the remaining instalments. The Plaintiff
sought the return of the shares. The Defendant argued that the provisions for
return of the shares were penal and in addition sought relief against forfeiture.
The trial judge struck out the application for relief because of the Defendant's
failure to comply with an order to disclose documents relating to his own financial position. There was no appeal against this.
In this case, the contract provided that if the Defendant failed to make a payment he should return the shares. The Court of Appeal held that there was no
reason why the penalty rule could not apply to a transfer of property as much
as the payment of money. It followed that simply to order reconveyance of the
shares would be penal, but simply to leave the Plaintiff to his action for the balance of the price would go too far in the opposite direction.
The majority of the Court of Appeal, Dillon and Nicholls, LJJ., held that the
solution was to offer the Plaintiff a choice of an order for sale of the shares and
payment of the unpaid instalments and interest out of the proceeds or to make
an order for reconveyance of the shares, subject to an inquiry as to their present
value and appropriate orders. The Plaintiff could be offered this choice but he
would be free to decline both alternatives.
5
5

Cavendish at ¶ 17-18, ¶ 160-161, ¶ 227, ¶ 291, ¶ 294.
Jobson v. Johnson, (1989) 1 WLR 1026 (1989) 1 All ER 621.
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On these facts, but for the Defendants failure to comply with the order for disclosure, the Court would have been very likely to grant relief on the basis that
the Defendant should retain the shares so long as he complied with an order to
pay the balance of the price and interests and costs. If he failed to make the payments there would have been an order for reconveyance of the shares with consequential financial provisions. We do not know why the Defendant did not make
the disclosure and did not appeal but the most plausible reason is that this would
have involved revealing information about his financial position, which he wished
to keep to himself. There are hints in Kerr, LJ.'s partial dissent that the shares
had become substantially more valuable.
Lord Neuberger criticised the final result of the case. He said 9
"As a result of his default in giving disclosure, he was able to achieve a better
result than he would have done if he had given disclosure."
Lord Hodge agreed. 6 0

VIII. CAVENDISH SQUARE HOLDING
BV V. TALAL EL MAKDESSI
We now turn to the cases considered by the Supreme Court. The facts of
the two cases are totally different and neither is easy. In Cavendish, the sums
involved are very large; the contract took some 6 months to negotiate and wellknown London solicitors advised both sides.
Cavendish was a subsidiary of WPP, the World's largest communication services group. Mr. Makdessi was a leading Lebanese businessman with a group of
companies, which have become largest advertising and marketing group in the
Middle East. There were a large number of companies. The holding company
was Team Y & R Holdings Hong Kong Ltd. (Team). There were 1,000 issued
shares in Team, of which 126 shares were held by another subsidiary of WPP.
The scheme of the contract was that Mr. Makdessi and a colleague would sell 474
shares, so that 60% of the shares would be held by Cavendish and 40% by the
sellers.
The agreement, dated 2 8th February 2008, provided for an initial payment
of US $34 million payable on completion of the contract and three further payments, two of which were dependant, in amount, on the profits for 2007-2009 and
2007-2011. The sellers retained 40% of the shares and there were detailed provisions about their continued involvement. It is clear that the very substantial sums
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paid or promised included a large element, perhaps as much as half for goodwill,
associated with a continued involvement of the sellers.
The critical provisions in the agreement for the purpose of the case were:
"5.1 If a seller becomes a Defaulting Shareholder [which is
defined as including 'a Seller which is in breach of clause 11.2;]
he shall not be entitled to receive the Interim Payment and/
or the Final Payment which would other than for his having
become a Defaulting Shareholder have been paid to him and
[Cavendish's] obligations to make such payments shall cease.
5.6 Each Seller hereby grants an option to [Cavendish] pursuant to which, in
the event that such Seller becomes a Defaulting Shareholder, [Cavendish] may
require such Seller to sell to [Cavendish] all of the shares held by that Seller (the
Defaulting Shareholder Shares). [Cavendish] shall buy and such Seller shall sell
the Defaulting Shareholder Shares within 30 days of receipt by such Seller of a
notice from [Cavendish] exercising such option in consideration for the payment
by [Cavendish] to such Seller of the Defaulting Shareholder Option Price [defined
as 'an amount equal to the [NAV] on the date that the relevant Seller becomes a
Defaulting Shareholder multiplied by [the percentage which represents the proportion of the total shares the relevant Seller holds]."
It was clear by 2010 that Mr. Makdessi had become a "Defaulting
Shareholder" by offering services to competing companies and proceedings
were started in late 2010. Mr. Makdessi argued that these clauses were penalties.
Burton J held that they were not; The Court of Appeal disagreed but the Supreme
Court restored Burton J's judgment. The decision was unanimous but not completely so as to the reasons.
Lord Neuberger considered that Clause 5.1 was part of the definition of
Cavendish's primary obligation and therefore wholly outside the penalty area.6 1
Lord Hodge thought that this was a strong argument but that even if Clause
5.1 was a secondary provision, it was not, in the circumstances, penal. 62 Lord
Clarke 63 and Lord Toulson 6 4 agreed with Lord Hodge. Lord Mance, though more
cautiously, took the same view. 65
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Lord Neuberger also thought that Clause 5.6 was a primary obligation 66 and
Lord Mance agreed. 6 7 Lord Hodge 68 and Lord Clarke 69 preferred to regard the
Clause as secondary, but on the facts not penal. The moral, which most clearly
emerges from this, is the importance for the draftsman to formulate key obligations as primary rather than secondary wherever possible.

IX. PARKINGEYE LTD.V. BEAVIS70
This was a very different, but also far from easy case. It concerned the control
of car parking near to a supermarket. It should perhaps be explained that English
supermarkets have come to seek to attract customers with cars by the provision
of car parking but that the car park is often attractive to other motors. Companies
have emerged, like the Plaintiff in the present case, whose principal function is
the management of such parking spaces.
In this case, the Plaintiffs had been engaged to manage a car park in
Chelmsford. They put up some 20 signs at the car park that stated clearly that
the maximum stay was 2 hours, which would be free, and that afterwards there
would be a parking charge of 85 £. Mr. Beavis stayed in the car park on 15 th
April 2013 for 2 hours, 56 minutes (this was observed by automatic cameras,
which filmed all entries and departures and noted the number plate of the car).
Mr Beavis received a notice demanding payment of 85 £ within 28 days but
offering a reduction to 50 £ if he paid within 14 days. He did not pay and the
Plaintiff started the present action. He argued that the sum was a penalty. (He
also relied on a 1999 Consumer Protection Regulation. This argument was unsuccessful but we will not examine it here.)
The case was fought on the basis that Mr. Beavis's act in parking his car created a contract, even though if he had left before 2 hours he would not have had
to pay.7' All members of the Supreme Court were agreed that the penalty rule
was engaged. Mr. Beavis had contracted to leave within 2 hours and had broken
that promise. The 85 £ was payable on that breach. Parking Eye had not suffered
85 £ worth of damage but that was not the test. The Court looked at a range
of other charges. The charge for illegal on street parking is not so high except
in Central London but this parking has no free hours. Looking at the question
broadly, 85 £ was in the circumstances not unreasonable.

¶ 82-88.
Cavendish at ¶ 182,183.
68
Cavendish at ¶ 280.
69
Cavendish at ¶ 291.
o ParkingEye Ltd. v. Beavis, 2015 UKSC 67.
71
This view is not totally without difficulties but we will not examine them here.
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X. CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that these cases require careful thought in both Australia and
England. They should receive careful consideration in other common law jurisdictions. It would not be a surprise if they provoke a number of other decisions,
but some of the most important lessons are for the contract draftsman. Even in
Australia, it must be better, where possible to write the contract such that the
event which triggers the obligation is not a breach of contract. Similarly a provision is unlikely to be struck down as penal if it states a primary obligation.
It is clear that there are cases where one party promises to make a payment
if he breaks the contract so that the penalty rule is engaged but where the test
is not whether the agreed sum is a reasonable pre-estimate of damage. This was
the case in Dunlop and now in Parking Eye. In both cases there was a legitimate
interest to be protected and the agreed sum was not too large.

